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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Rodney Matt, who suffers from severe Bipolar Disorder, Type I, pied guilty to
felony driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI). The district court imposed a fiveyear unified sentence, with two and one-half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction while
Mr. Matt participated in a rider program. He was assigned to the CAPP program, and
upon arriving at that facility, the program personnel changed his medication regimen. It
had taken some three years to stabilize his original regimen.
Unsurprisingly, Mr. Matt did not adjust well to the new medication, and it
impacted his ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in the rider program.
Nevertheless, he attempted to complete the rider program, but was not successful. As
a result, he was returned to the district court with a recommendation that it relinquish
jurisdiction. His regimen was readjusted when he returned from the CAPP facility and
he stabilized. Once he did so, he was willing and able to meaningfully and effectively
participate while on this new regimen.
Despite that situation, explained to the district court in a letter from Mr. Matt's
doctor (who advised that the alteration to Mr. Matt's medication regimen was the likely
cause of his inability to meaningfully and effectively participate in the rider program), the
district court decided to relinquish jurisdiction. Mr. Matt contends that this was an abuse
of its discretion. Alternatively, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by
not reducing the underlying sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) when it relinquished jurisdiction. This Court should remedy the

district court's abuse of discretion.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Matt has experienced severe mental health issues related to his diagnosed
Bipolar Disorder, Type 1. 1

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9;

Confidential Letter from Bridgeway Counseling dated 4-13-11.pdf (hereinafter, 4/13/11
Bridgeway Letter).)2

Mr. Matt's manic episodes have previously included psychotic

features and have been accompanied by severe anxiety symptoms.
Bridgeway Letter; PSI, p.9.)

(4/13/11

Dr. Katrina K. Bentley, who was Mr. Matt's treating

physician, determined that, while suffering from one of these anxiety attacks, Mr. Matt is
unfit for work, even if he is taking medication at the time. (PSI, p.9.) At its worst, his
condition has caused him to attempt suicide on four different occasions. (PSI, p.9.) In
fact, it took Dr. Bentley three years to identify and prescribe a stable medication
regimen for Mr. Matt, one which would help him function in society. (4/13/11 Bridgeway
Letter.)
In addition, Mr. Matt had a difficult childhood. His father was often drunk. (PSI,
p.7.)

His mother abused him, as well as alcohol.

1

(PSI, p.7.)

These issues led to

This is the more severe variety of Bipolar Disorder, in which mood swings between
mania and depression constitute drastic variations from normal behavior. National
Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, "Bipolar Disorder,"
pp.4-5 (2008), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolar-disorder/nimh-bipolaradults.pdf. These episodes are more drastic and longer in duration than those
experienced in patients with Bipolar Disorder, Type II. Id. They may also lead to the
need for immediate hospitalization. Id.
2
PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"Confidential Presentence Report dated July 1, 201 0.pdf." Included in this file is the PSI
report, as well as several of the documents that were attached thereto (i.e., police
reports). However, several exhibits which were included with the PSI are contained in
individual electronic pdf documents. They are initially identified by their electronic
designation and subsequently referred to by an appropriate shorthand designation. If
there are multiple pages in the electronic document, they are accompanied by a
reference to the electronic page number.
2

Mr. Matt dropping out of school. 3 (PSI, p.7.)
sisters took him in.

He was placed in foster care until his

(PSI, p.7.) However, he now has a wife and two children, who

continue to support him. (See, e.g., 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) One of his sisters has
also articulated her continuing support. (Confidential Letter from Deborah Matt Teske
11-16-1 0.pdf (hereinafter, 11/6/10 Teske Letter).)
Nevertheless, Mr. Matt has struggled with alcohol, accumulating several
misdemeanor, alcohol-related offenses. (PSI, pp.4-6.) The instant offense, however, is
his first felony charge.

(See PSI, pp.4-6.) His mental health issues have limited his

ability to effectively address these offenses. For example, he cannot get access to the
DUI problem-solving court because he suffers from a mental health condition, and
because his underlying crimes are DUls, he is ineligible for the mental health problemsolving court. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.11, Ls.2-8.) 4 Therefore, although a problem-solving court
may have presented the most appropriate solution in his case, the court imposed a fiveyear unified sentence, with two and one-half years fixed, on Mr. Matt and retained
jurisdJction. (R., pp.124-126.)
Mr. Matt was subsequently transported to the CAPP facility. (Confidential Report
from Idaho CAPP Family dated 2-23-2011.pdf (hereinafter, APSI), p.1.) Once there, his
medication regimen was adjusted (for example, he was switched to the anti-depressant
Ceylexa). 5 (Confidential Letter from IDOC dated May 6, 2011.pdf (hereinafter, 5/6/11
3

He has since earned his GED. (PSI, p.8.)
The transcripts for the Change of Plea hearing (held on 4/28/10), the Sentencing
hearing (held on 11/10/10), and the Rider Review hearing (held on 5/18/11, and which
was a continuation of the original Jurisdictional Review Hearing) are all contained in the
same bound volume and are consecutively paginated. That volume will be referred to
as "Tr. Vol. 1." The transcript for the Jurisdictional Review Hearing, held on 4/6/11, is in
a separately-bound and paginated volume (hereinafter, Tr. Vol. 2).
5
Dr. Bentley advised the district court that it took three years for her to craft a stable
medication regimen for Mr. Matt. (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) Clinical Supervisor Joan
4

3

IDOC Letter), p.1; Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, Ls.18-19.) Clinical Supervisor Joan M. Sheehan also
noted that Mr. Matt was not ingesting medications at some point during his period of
retained jurisdiction. 6 (5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.) Mr. Matt negatively reacted to these
adjustments to his medication regimen.

(Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, Ls.20-21.)

In fact, he was

placed on suicide watch during the time he was on this altered regimen. (APSI, p.12,
1/5/11 C-Note (referencing the fact that Mr. Matt was placed on suicide watch); APSI,
p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note (referencing the fact that Mr. Matt was no longer being given his
medications)/ Based on her experiences with Mr. Matt, Dr. Bentley explained that
the alteration to Mr. Matt's regimen and the resulting negative impact would likely
undermine his ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in the rider programs.
(4/13/11

Bridgeway Letter.)

Nonetheless, Mr. Matt fought to succeed at the

programming, and his efforts merited two positive entries in his C-Notes for his work.
(See APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note; APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note.)

Regardless, the

M. Sheehan discussed a professional perspective that holds certain medications should
not be given to recovering alcoholics because they create a similar effect on the
nervous system as alcohol, presumably to explain why IVlr. Matt's regimen was altered.
(5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.) Ms. Sheehan also discussed the fact that Mr. Matt had been
prescribed various anti-depressants since 1999, which included Lexapro. (5/6/11 IDOC
Letter, p.1.) She appears to justify prescribing Ceylexa by stating it is only a variation of
Lexapro. (5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.) She does not discuss the impacts such alterations
to a medication regimen could have on the patient. (See generally 5/6/11 IDOC Letter.)
She also expressed her opinion that Mr. Matt's condition did not affect his ability to
participate in the program. (Confidential Email notes from Joan M.Sheehan [sic], LCPC,
CCS.pdf (hereinafter, Sheehan notes), p.2.) Dr. Bentley informed the district court that
Mr. Matt is unable to function when he suffers a bipolar episode. (4/13/11 Bridgeway
Letter; PSI, p.9.) She also informed the court that this alteration in his medication
regimen could cause him to be unable to participate in the rider program. (4/13/11
Bridgeway Letter.)
6
There is a dispute about whether the program staff took him off the medication or he
stopped taking the medications himself. (Compare APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note with
5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.)
7
The C-Notes are attached to the APSI and will be individually identified with a
reference to the date they were entered. (APSI, pp.11-14.)
4

program staff reported to the district court that Mr. Matt had resisted all programming,
looking instead for reasons to not participate. 8 (APSI, p.4.) Ms. Sheehan reported that
Mr. Matt, in fact, presented with a normal mood and, in her opinion, was only trying to
avoid accepting personal responsibility. 9 (5/6/11 IDOC Letter, pp.1-2.)
At Mr. Matt's rider review hearing, the district court determined that "he [Mr. Matt]
appeared pretty disinterested in doing anything." (Tr. Vol. 2, p.10, Ls.5-6.) It decided,
however, to consider the effect the alteration to the medication regimen would have. 10
Dr. Bentley, Mr. Matt's former treating physician, advised the district court that this
alteration in Mr. Matt's medication regimen would likely have impacted his ability to
meaningfully and effectively participate in the rehabilitative programs.
Bridgeway Letter.)

(4/13/11

Ms. Sheehan, a counselor and clinical supervisor at the CAPP

facility, did not provide an opinion on that question. (See generally 5/6/11 IDOC Letter.)
8

The district court imposed Mr. Matt's sentence on November 10, 2010. (Tr. Vol. 1,
p.19, L.1.) As such, it retained jurisdiction for the next 365 days. I.C. § 19-2601 (4).
Therefore, its jurisdiction was not set to expire until approximately November 10, 2011.
(APSI, p.1.) The program staff authored the APSI recommending relinquishment on
February 23, 2011. (APSI, p.1.) That recommendation was submitted for review on
March 2, 2011. (3/2/11 C-Note.) The APSI was filed with the district court on March 30,
2011. (APSI, p.1.) The district court held a rider review hearing on April 6, 2011.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.7, Ls.1, 8.) The district court continued the hearing so it could receive
information about the alteration to Mr. Matt's medication regimen. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.12,
Ls.17-22.) The hearing was continued and concluded on May 18, 2011. (Tr. Vol. 1,
p.29, L.1.) The order relinquishing jurisdiction was filed on June 6, 2011. (R., p.143.)
Therefore, at the latest point in these proceedings, the district court still had
approximately six months remaining in the statutory grant for Mr. Matt to return and
complete his rider program while on a stable medication regimen, although there were
other, earlier points in the process where Mr. Matt could have been returned to the
rrogram.
While a patient may initially present as normal, Bipolar Disorder, Type I is defined by
the patient's major manic and depressive variations from the norm. See National
Institute of Mental Health, supra note 1.
10
As both the 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter and the 5/6/11 IDOC Letter were provided to
the district court after this hearing, it is presumed they were submitted to inform the
district court on this matter. (See R., p.142.)

5

She did, however, explain why part of Mr. Matt's medical regimen was not administered,
noted that the new medication (Ceylexa) was a variation of one that had been
previously prescribed (Lexapro), discussed the reason for his placement on suicide
watch, and suggested that, in her opinion, Mr. Matt was merely trying to not accept
personal responsibility.

(5/6/11 IDOC Letter, pp.1-2.)

Dr. Bentley reaffirmed that

Mr. Matt suffers from Bipolar Disorder, Type I, has recently experienced severe manic
episodes with psychotic features and severe anxiety, and would be unable to
meaningfully and effectively participate in programs if his medication were having a
negative effect on him.

(4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.)

In fact, Dr. Bentley suggested

Mr. Matt be afforded a second opportunity to participate in the rehabilitative programs
due to the impact the medication change had on his first period of retained jurisdiction.
(See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.)
The district court, like Ms. Sheehan, did not discuss what impact the alteration to
Mr. Matt's medication regimen had on his performance during his period of retained
jurisdiction before it relinquished its jurisdiction.

(R., pp.143-44.)

Mr. Matt timely

appealed from that order. (R., p.148.) He subsequently filed a motion for reduction of
his sentence pursuant to Rule 35.

(R., pp.165-68.)

The district court denied that

motion. 11 (Augmentation - Rule 35 Order.)

11

The order denying the Rule 35 motion is not challenged on appeal.
6

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and executed
Mr. Matt's excessive unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years fixed,
for felony DUI?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Its Jurisdiction And
Executed Mr. Matt's Excessive Unified Sentence Of Five Years, With Two And One-Half
Years Fixed, For Felony DUI

A.

Introduction
While Mr. Matt may have performed poorly during his period of retained

jurisdiction, he provided the district court with sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his
sub-par performance was due to the alteration of his medication regimen. As such, the
district court was without sufficient information from which it could determine whether
probation could be an appropriate option in Mr. Matt's case. Therefore, it was an abuse
of discretion to relinquish jurisdiction without giving Mr. Matt a meaningful opportunity to
successfully complete his period of retained jurisdiction, and in doing so, provide the
district court with that sufficient information.
Furthermore, the district court insufficiently considered the evidence that was
before it when it made its decision to relinquish jurisdiction.

Notably, it failed to

sufficiently consider the impact of Mr. Matt's mental health issues (especially his
prospects when he is allowed to remain on a stable medication regimen), his prior
record, his abusive childhood, and his continuing familial support. Therefore, even on
the evidence available at the time, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction
constituted an abuse of its discretion.
Alternatively, a sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors in this case
reveals that the underlying sentence is excessive and therefore, the district court should
have reduced it, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35 when it relinquished jurisdiction. Not
doing so constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion.
remedy those abuses.
8

This Court should

B.

The Court's Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction In Light Of The Evidence About
The Effect Altering His Medications Had On His Rider Constitutes An Abuse Of
Discretion
Mr. Matt asserts that, given any view of the facts, relinquishing jurisdiction and

executing his unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, is an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011); State v.
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001).

The decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not

be considered an abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information
to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate."
State v. Metwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). "The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after

imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the
defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho
203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990).
In making that determination, the district court "considers all of the circumstances
to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to
determine the course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection
of society, deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. It is guided in this
determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Metwin, 131 Idaho at 648. In this regard, the need to
protect society is the primary objective the district court should consider.

See, e.g.,

State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a disposition that protects

society

and

also

accomplishes

the

other

recognized

sentencing

objectives

(rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment) will be considered reasonable.

See id.

This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives,
and therefore, each must be addressed in the disposition. See id.

9

There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the
objectives are served by a particular disposition.

See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho

318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character,
status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to
treatment, and support of family." Id. These factors are also reflected by the factors set
forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for
a more lenient sentence in several cases.

See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho

482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117

Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, the
district court insufficiently considered the impact of several of these factors in regard to
Mr. Matt's performance on his rider.
But more importantly, because of the impact from the change to his medication
regimen, the district court did not have "sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." See Merwin, 131 Idaho at
648. Therefore, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of the district
court's discretion. See, e.g., Statton, 136 Idaho at 137; Lee, 117 Idaho at 205.

1.

The Most Critical Factor In This Case Is Mr. Matt's Mental Health
Condition, The Insufficient Consideration Of Which Alone Reveals That
The District Court's Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction Constitutes An
Abuse Of Discretion

The first factor the court needed to sufficiently consider was Mr. Matt's mental
health condition. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code§ 19-2523
not just suggests, but requires, the district court to consider a defendant's mental illness
as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Matt's mental
10

health has been consistently insufficiently considered and it has prevented him from
getting meaningful treatment. He is unable to get into the DUI diversion court because
of his mental illness. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.11, Ls.5-7.) However, he is also ineligible for the
mental health problem-solving court because his underlying offense is a DUI. (Tr. Vol.
1, p.11, Ls.4-5.) His mental health issues, therefore, have prevented him from being
able to participate in those problem-solving courts, which may have provided for
effective rehabilitation. (See, Tr., Vol. 1, p.11, Ls.9-16 (defense counsel presenting an
alternative plan to provide Mr. Matt with similar treatment to that he would have received
in the problem-solving courts).)
Next, when Mr. Matt began the CAPP program, his medication regimen was
adjusted. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, L.16 - p.9, L. 7.) This adjustment had a negative
effect on him, affecting his behavior and ability to meaningfully and effectively
pa1iicipate in the rider program. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, L.16 - p.9, L.7.) Dr. Bentley,
who had been treating Mr. Matt for several years, wrote a letter to the district court
explaining that when she began treating Mr. Matt, it took three years to stabilize his
medication regimen. (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) During that process, they found that
several medications affected Mr. Matt's ability to function or behave properly. 12 (4/13/11
Bridgeway Letter.) Accordingly, Dr. Bentley advised the court: "It is likely that when he
was adjusting to medications while incarcerated he may not have been able to
participate in substance abuse treatment classes due to medication response issues."

12

This suggests that, while some alternative forms of effective medications might be
available (i.e., Cylexia instead of Lexipro), the alternative medication could, regardless,
be ineffective and lead to Mr. Matt's inability to function effectively or appropriately. This
would result in the deprivation of Mr. Matt's meaningful opportunity to effectively
participate, even if the medication change was only to an alternate form of his stable
regimen medications.
11

(4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) This is a critical medical issue that the district court needed
to carefully consider in crafting its disposition. A sufficient consideration of this factor
reveals that changes in Mr. Matt's medication regimen, a factor not entirely within his
control, would severely impact his ability to obtain meaningful treatment during the
period of retained jurisdiction.
The only evidence that is at all contradictory to Dr. Bentley's perspective was the
opinion from Joan Sheehan, a counselor with the CAPP program. She suggested that
Mr. Matt actually experiences aspects of an addictive personality, presents normal
range of emotions, and demonstrates unwillingness to accept personal responsibility.
(5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1; Sheehan Notes, p.2.) This however, does not actually refute
Dr. Bentley's assertion that the cause of Mr. Matt's inability to perform appropriately in
the program was the medication alteration.

Furthermore, because Bipolar Disorder,

Type I is defined by major manic or depressive variations from the norm, see National
Institute of Mental Health, supra note 1, Ms. Sheehan's assertion that Mr. Matt
presented a normal range of emotion is irrelevant. That Mr. Matt may have been stable
at some points during his period of retained jurisdiction does not, ipso facto, mean that
he did not experience bipolar episodes during that time, or that the alteration to his
medication regimen did not negatively affect his ability to participate in the program.
Therefore, even if Mr. Matt may have initially presented a normal range of emotions, a
sufficient consideration of his diagnosed condition reveals that the decision to tinker with
his medications deprived him of the meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in
the program.
Additionally, providing him ineffective medications would not control those
episodes, thus causing him to be unable to meaningfully and effectively perform in the
12

activities. (See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) Ms. Sheehan did not discuss the impact an
alteration to Mr. Matt's medication regimen might have on his ability to perform
satisfactorily in the CAPP programs. (See generally 5/6/11 IDOC Letter.) Therefore,
there is no evidence in the record which refutes Dr. Bentley's assertion that the
alteration to Mr. Matt's regimen deprived him of the ability to meaningfully and
effectively participate in the program.
There is, however, evidence that he was, in fact, negatively affected by the
alteration in his regimen.

For example, while on this altered medication regimen,

Mr. Matt was placed on suicide watch.

(APSI, p.12, 1/5/11 C-Note (referencing his

placement on suicide watch); APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note (referencing his report that he
had been taken off his medication).) According to the record, his previous attempts at
suicide had occurred in 1999, before he began receiving treatment from Dr. Bentley.
(PSI, p.9.) This indicates that, not only was he experiencing a bipolar episode at that
time (which contradicts Ms. Sheehan's perspective that Mr. Matt presented a normal
range of emotions), but also the new medications were not effective in controlling
his condition.

This is consistent with Dr. Bentley's opinion, that Mr. Matt would

experience severe problems functioning "[w]hen he took medications that he could not
tolerate .... " (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) The suicide threat indicates that Mr. Matt
did, in fact, experience a severe problem while on this new medication, demonstrating
that he was negatively affected by this new regimen.
The continuing insufficient consideration of Mr. Matt's mental health issues is
illuminated by the evidence presented in the APSI.

The program manager's report

indicates that, from the beginning of his program, Mr. Matt refused to perform, looking
instead for ways out of the treatment groups. (APSI, p.4.) However, the APSI does not
13

mention the contradictory evidence contained in the attached C-Notes. For example, on
December 30, 2010, a note was entered indicating that:
participating in the TAP 19 Relapse Prevention program.

[several] core programs at the CAPP facility . . . . "

"Mr. Matt is actively
He is also engaging in

(APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note

(emphasis added).) Specifically, he was working on the "Pre-Release Handbook, Work
Force Readiness Program, Partners in Parenting, Aztec Skill building programs, Each
One Teach One, Character Building, Moral Virtue and Mr. Matt is also improving his
thinking, speaking, dealing with peers." (APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note.) Furthermore,
while he was experiencing some struggles, "Group facilitator is not overly concerned
with these behaviors yet. Mr. Matt has been able to accept input and/or feedback from
other group members as well as facilitator. Mr. Matt is beginning to connect how his
behaviors and choices have impacted his life along with causing the consequences
which has Mr. Matt in this type of setting." (APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note.) He received
a similarly positive C-Note on January 20, 2011. (APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note.) This
indicates that he had some ability to function, and was putting forth the effort to
succeed, contrary to the program manager's report.

But, as Dr. Bentley indicated,

without a stabilized medication regimen, it would be unlikely that Mr. Matt could
meaningfully and effectively participate in the programs.

(See 4/13/11 Bridgeway

Letter.)
This also reveals that the district court's conclusion that "he [Mr. Matt] appeared
pretty disinterested in doing anything," is clearly erroneous in light of all the evidence
before it. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.10, Ls.5-6.) A sufficient examination of this factor - Mr. Matt's
mental health issues - reveals that when he is receiving a stable medication regimen,
he is able to function. (See Tr. Vol. 2, p.9, Ls.3-22 (informing the court that Mr. Matt has
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since been placed on a stable medication regimen and has been able to save money,
and is willing and able to participate in private treatment opportunities or participate
meaningfully in another rider program).) However, as his doctor pointed out, altering
that regimen would affect his ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in such
programs, particularly if he had a negative reaction to that new regimen.

(4/13/11

Bridgeway Letter.) The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Matt experienced a negative
reaction while on that altered regimen. (See APSI, p.12, 1/5/11 C-Note.) Despite that,
he was still working to be constructive. (See APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note; APSI, p.11,
1/20/11 C-Note.)

Therefore, a sufficient examination of this factor indicates that

Mr. Matt has the potential to succeed in rehabilitative programming, provided his
medication regimen is not destabilized.
Therefore, a sufficient consideration of this factor reveals that Mr. Matt was not
afforded a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in the rehabilitative program,
and so should have been returned to a rider program staying on his current medication
regimen, on which he has stabilized. 13 (Tr. Vol. 2, p.9, Ls.15-22.) Without providing him
a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate, the district court did not have
"sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. It is important to note the Idaho Supreme
Court's implication, also adopted by the Court of Appeals, that there is a presumption
that probation will be the result, since the evidence must show that "probation would be

13

There were at least six months remaining in Mr. Matt's period of retained jurisdiction
when the district court decided to relinquish that jurisdiction. See n.8, supra.
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inappropriate." 14 Id.; Statton, 136 Idaho at 137 (the district court "considers all of the
circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured
environment and to determine the course of action that will further the purposes of
rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution.") (emphasis added);
Lee, 117 Idaho at 205 ("The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence
is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation
potential and suitability for probation.") (emphasis added).

The evidence does not

demonstrate that probation would be inappropriate, since Mr. Matt is able to function
properly when on the appropriate medication, and in that case, would be suitable for
probation. The only evidence against this conclusion is that Mr. Matt can appear normal
at times and when he is on the inappropriate medication, he performs badly. Therefore,
since there is insufficient evidence to determine that Mr. Matt was not suitable for
probation, the presumption would swggest that Mr. Matt should have been placed on
probation, or at worst, returned to the program and given a meaningful opportunity to

14

This is also consistent with the Legislature's instructions in this regard: "The court
shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence
of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and
the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that
imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public. . . . " I.C. § 19-2521(1)
(emphasis added). As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized in regard to this
particular statute, the focus is on the intent of the Legislature in providing these
suggestions to the district court on the exercise of its discretion. State v. Stover, 140
Idaho 927, 931-32 (2004). The language the Legislature chose to use clearly indicates
that the district court, when exercising its sentencing discretion, should start with the
presumption that it will impose probation, unless it finds that society requires the more
intensive protection provided by incarcerating the defendant. See I.C. § 19-2521 (1);
Statton, 136 Idaho at 137; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; Lee, 117 Idaho at 205. This does
not mean that everyone convicted of a crime should be placed on probation. See
Stover, 140 Idaho at 932; see also State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143 (2001)
(holding that where the State only provides the possibility for probation, there is no due
process expectation that the defendant will receive probation). Rather, it only indicates
that the Legislature suggested the district court favor the result of probation unless its
analysis of the factors indicates incarceration is necessary. See I.C. § 19-2521(1).
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effectively participate in the program in order to gain sufficient information to overcome
the implied presumption and determine whether or not probation is inappropriate.
See, e.g., Statton, 136 Idaho at 137; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; Lee, 117 Idaho at 205.

As a result, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction without providing
Mr. Matt with a meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate constitutes an abuse of
discretion. A sufficient consideration of his mental health issues reveals that he has
some ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in these programs, even when
his medications are negatively impacting him. Therefore, if Mr. Matt were given the
opportunity to participate while receiving the proper, stabilized medication regimen, he
would have a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in the programs.
However, without providing that meaningful opportunity to effectively participate, the
district court cannot have the necessary sufficient information to determine whether
probation is inappropriate. Id. As such, the district court should have allowed Mr. Matt
to return and complete his rider while on stable medications, or otherwise placed him on
probation.

Either way, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction without providing that

meaningful opportunity constitutes an abuse of discretion. Based on this abuse alone,
this Court should afford Mr. Matt an appropriate remedy.

2.

The District Court's Insufficient Consideration Of Several Other Mitigating
Factors Further Demonstrates Its Abuse Of Discretion

In addition to Mr. Matt's mental health issues, there are several other factors that
the district court insufficiently considered when it decided to relinquish jurisdiction,
all of which suggest that the more lenient disposition is the appropriate in this case.
In particular, they are that this was Mr. Matt's first felony, that he had an abusive
childhood, and that he has continuing familial support.
17

First, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595,
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). Therefore, it considered the fact that it

was the defendant's first felony to be a factor in mitigation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.
Thus, the fact that this is Mr. Matt's first felony, (PSI, pp.4-6), is a factor the district court
needed to consider in mitigation.
Second, the district court should have sufficiently considered Mr. Matt's troubled
childhood, which is a factor it should have weighed against the offense.

See

State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001 ). In Williamson, the Court of

Appeals considered the defendant's abusive childhood, which served as a precursor to
the defendant's abuse of various narcotic substances and played a role in the offense
before the court. Id. In this case, during Mr. Matt's childhood, his father was drunk and
his mother physically abused him. (PSI, p.7.) These familial problems caused him to
drop out of school. 15 (PSI, p.8.) He was placed in foster care until his sisters took him
in. (PSI, p.7.) The problems culminated with his mother's suicide. (PSI, p.7.) Thus,
they served as a precursor to his own alcohol problems, which was a factor in his
offense. Therefore, a sufficient consideration of this factor, particularly in light of his
mental health issues, reveals that a more lenient disposition is appropriate in this case.
Third, Mr. Matt has continuing support from his family.

Family constitutes an

important part of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis,
148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that familial support offered to affirm the
defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in consideration of

15

He has, however, since earned his GED. (PSI, p.8.)
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rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a
mitigating factor worthy of consideration), rev. denied. His family has demonstrated its
continuing support for him in his treatment and rehabilitation. For example, his wife and
daughters accompany him to meetings with Dr. Bentley.

(4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.)

One of his sisters has also articulated her continuing support.

(See 11/6/10 Teske

Letter.) And as Mr. Matt indicated during his period of retained jurisdiction, his plan for
a potential probationary period was to return and live with his family.

(APSI, p.14,

12/19/10 C-Note.) That plan was acceptable to his assigned probation officer. (APSI,
p.12, 1/10/11 C-Note.)

Mr. Matt also has continuing support from Dr. Bentley, who

informed the district court that, should Mr. Matt be released back into the community,
she would be willing to continue providing him help and treatment. (4/13/11 Bridgeway
Letter.)

Thus, this factor, too, indicates that a more lenient disposition, one which

provides a meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate, would be appropriate. See,
e.g., Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55.

A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient
disposition, one aimed at rehabilitation, also addresses all the other objectives protection of society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho
703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing
objectives). When a sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it still imposes and executes a
sentence.

Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed

sentence are still present. See, e.g., State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App.
2008) (discussing how even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the
sentencing objectives and how the role that a court's continuing jurisdiction affects
those objectives), rev. dismissed. Such a sentence punishes Mr. Matt by depriving him
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not only of his liberty during his period of retained jurisdiction, but several of his rights
(such as the right to possess a firearm) as well, since this is a felony offense. These
results, along with the imposed sentence, also serve as a deterrent to society at large.
See id. Furthermore, it deters Mr. Matt specifically because the sentence need not be

suspended should he perform poorly while having a meaningful opportunity to
effectively participate.

Even if he completes the rider program and is placed on

probation, the looming sentence still deters him from violating his probation.
In this case, the district court does not lose anything in terms of protection of
society, deterrence, or punishment by continuing to retain jurisdiction. Society receives
equally similar protection by sending him on a rider as it does by incarcerating him.
Mr. Matt is in the custody of the Department of Correction either way. He cannot harm
society during that period, so society is protected whether he is on a rider or in prison.
Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to leave Mr. Matt incarcerated for the
entire fixed term of the sentence if Mr. Matt does not show progress after he has a
meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in his rider program.

However, the

district court could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed
by the meaningful opportunity to effectively participate.
What the continued period of retained jurisdiction does provide, that a term
sentence does not, is the meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate, and as the
Idaho Supreme Court has noted, timely rehabilitation is more likely to be effective.
See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402.

The Court of Appeals has also recognized that such

opportunities should be timely and effective.

See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489;

see also State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1998). In order for Mr. Matt to

have a meaningful and effective rehabilitative opportunity, he needs to be properly
20

medicated. (See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) Because his only opportunity to participate
in the rider program was marred by a maladjusted medication regimen, it was neither
meaningful nor effective.

By not affording Mr. Matt a meaningful opportunity

to effectively rehabilitate, the district court essentially discounts all potential for
rehabilitation and successful reentry into society. The Court of Appeals has determined
that a sentence which operates in that way is unacceptable.

See Cook, 145 Idaho

at 489.
Therefore, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction without providing
Mr. Matt with a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in the rider programs
constitutes an abuse of its discretion. This is because the district court did not have
sufficient information to determine whether Mr. Matt would be likely to succeed in a less
structured environment. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. This
is also because it did not sufficiently consider all the mitigating factors present in
Mr. Matt's case.

See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.

Therefore, this Court should remedy that abuse.

C.

Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not, Sua Sponte,
Reducing Mr. Matt's Sentence When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
If the decision to relinquish jurisdiction was appropriate, the district court still

abused its discretion by not, sua sponte, reducing Mr. Matt's sentence pursuant to Rule
35 when it relinquished jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264
(Ct. App. 2003). The decision to reduce a sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is in the sound
discretion of the sentencing court and is reviewed under the same standards as the
original sentencing.

See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 450 (Ct. App. 1984);

State v. Villarreal, 126 Idaho 277,281 (Ct. App. 1994).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Matt does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

Id.

The protection of society is the primary objective the court should

consider. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. Therefore, a sentence that protects society
and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable.

Id.;

State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of

society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and therefore, each must be
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the
objectives are served by a particular sentence.

Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320.

They

include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more
lenient sentence in several cases.

See, e.g., Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; Cook, 145

Idaho 489-90. In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently
considered by the district court as it crafted Mr. Matt's sentence, and, as a result, the
sentence does not serve the objectives. However, a sufficient review of these factors
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reveals that the sentence of five years total, with two and one-half years fixed, is
excessive and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion by not reducing it when
it relinquished jurisdiction.
The district court's insufficient consideration of these factors was discussed in
detail in Section l(B)(1 )-(2), supra. Mr. Matt suffers from severe mental health issues,
which are able to be controlled, for the most part, with proper medication. The other
mitigating factors also indicate a more lenient sentence, one which promotes timely and
effective rehabilitation, would be appropriate and still serve the other sentencing
objectives Owen, 73 Idaho at 402 (discussing the need for timely and effective
rehabilitation); Crockett, 146 Idaho at 14-15 (discussing how even a sentence for a
period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the role that a
court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives).
In Mr. Matt's case, timely and effective rehabilitation would be best achieved by
providing him with a meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate and then returning
him to his support network, where he can apply those lessons in a real-life situation. He
has the support of his family and others, notably, his doctor.
Letter.)

(4/13/11 Bridgeway

Being with this support network can aid in the rehabilitation process.

See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817. It also addresses his mental health concerns because he

will be returned to the care and guidance of the doctor who is familiar with his condition
and who has been working with him for the past several years to ensure he is on a
stable and effective medication regimen, and thus able to meaningfully and effectively
participate in society. ( See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.)
Therefore, the sentence, which requires him to spend at least two and one-half
years in prison, but as much as five, depending on the determinations of the parole
23

board, 16 is excessive, given a sufficient consideration of the factors, and thus, the
sentencing objectives. Therefore, the district court's failure to, sua sponte, reduce it
when it relinquished jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of its discretion. This Court should
remedy that abuse.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Matt respectfully requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a
new sentencing hearing with instructions that the court continue to retain jurisdiction
while he participates on in new rider program. Alternatively, he respectfully requests
that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this

ih day of March,

2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

16

The parole board has broad discretion over whether or not to parole an inmate.
See, e.g., Stover, 140 Idaho at 931.
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